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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a tennis court during a Grand Slam championship. The court 
reverberates with the cacophony of the players hitting the ball, the squeak of 
tennis shoes, and the patter of running footsteps. Is it music? While many 
would argue that it is not, in fact, LCD Soundsystem’s James Murphy 
collaborated with IBM to create music from those very sounds during the 
2014 U.S. Open.
1
 From its humble beginnings in the Paleolithic flutes of the 
prehistoric era,
2
 through the opera halls of Europe,
3
 to the avant-garde 
creations of the post-modern era, composers have attempted to express the 
purest of human emotions through musical expression. Music has the ability 
to cross cultural barriers and, in a way, is one of the true universal languages. 
While music is a universally accepted and appreciated art form, its protections 
under intellectual property law could hardly be considered “harmonious” and 
have bedeviled both composers and copyright lawyers alike. 
Stemming from the first law granting protection to artistic expression, 
intellectual property law has struggled to grant musical works the same types 
of protection as other classes of protectable subject matter. As a consequence, 
what protection musical works do enjoy at the moment is dulled by the fact 
that those very protections were created while underestimating the ability of 
composers to challenge traditional notions of music. By basing copyright 
protection for musical works in traditional notions of music and musical 
composition, the law leaves gaps where composers of more modern works run 
the risk of not receiving the protection granted to their more traditional 
counterparts because their works do not fit the overly-narrow definition of 
“musical work” used by the Copyright Office. 
This comment will discuss the issues with the evolution of classical music 
in the late-20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries and traditional definitions of “musical 
works” as used in Section 102 of the Copyright Act. Section 102 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 clearly states that “musical works” are among the class 
of creative works that are granted copyright protection.
4
 However, Section 
101 does not define a “musical work”5 and as a result, the Copyright Office 
 
1. Sonia Saraiya, Here Are Some of the Songs James Murphy Made From U.S. Open Matches, 
A.V. CLUB (Sept. 11, 2014, 9:41 A.M.), http://www.avclub.com/article/here-are-some-songs-james-
murphy-made-us-open-matc-209109. 
2. Earliest Music Instruments Found, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-
18196349 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
3. See History of Classical Music, NAXOS, http://www.naxos.com/education/brief_history.asp 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). The late-romantic era of classical music was distinguished by attaching 
“story-lines” to music. 
4. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). 
5. See id. § 101. 
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relies on the definition of “musical work” found in its internal manual to 
discern whether a musical work warrants copyright protection. An overly 
narrow definition of the term “musical work” that does not take into account 
changing styles of classically music could lead to a class of composers not 
being afforded their rightful copyright protection. 
First, I will present a brief overview of copyright protections extended to 
music. Then, I will examine the Copyright Office’s reliance on the 
Compendium’s definition of “musical work” and highlight the issues that the 
definition presents to the evolution of music. Next, I will examine the 
evolution of classical music after the 20
th
 Century and its shift away from 
traditional connotations of musical composition and how this shift 
contravenes with the Compendium definition of music, including a 
comparison between traditional classical music and modern era classical 
music, which highlights these changes. Finally, I will outline a solution to the 
Compendium’s overly narrow definition of “musical work” in order to 
encompass a wider spectrum of musical works that deserve copyright 
protection and suggest that the Copyright Office weigh the elements of music 
equally, as well as utilizing the Compendium definition of “musical work” as 
a guideline, so as not to overly rely on a elemental analysis of a musical work. 
In expanding the definition of “musical work” and weighing the elements of 
music equally, composers whose works may not have been copyrightable will 
enjoy the full protections and exclusive rights that are associated with 
copyright. 
I. “MUSICAL WORKS” AND COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
Musical works have had a somewhat colorful history under the copyright 
law. While musical works are currently protected under the copyright law
6
, 
this protection came about after several revisions of the Copyright Act.
7
 The 
Act’s failure to define the term “musical work” has led to the Copyright 
Office adopting its own internal definition of the term. However, this 
definition is limiting and, with the evolution of music and composition 
techniques, could potentially raise issues of barring otherwise copyrightable 
musical works from receiving the protection that they deserve. 
A. Current Copyright Protections 
This section will discuss the current protections that musical works enjoy 
under the Copyright Act of 1976. For a work to be protected under copyright 
laws, the work must satisfy three elements: (1) it must be original, (2) it must 
 
6. See id. § 102. 
7. It was not until 1831 that musical works received copyright protection. 
YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2015  11:12 AM 
2015] POST-MODERN CLASSICAL MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT LAW 275 
 
be fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and (3) it must be a protected 
subject matter under Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
8
 Although 
originality is not defined in the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court in Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service concluded that a work is original if it 
possesses independent expression of an author that expresses a modicum of 
creativity.
9
 The creativity requirement under copyright validity stems from a 
requirement that comes from the textual references in the Copyright Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.
10
 A work is tangible for purposes of the 1976 Act if it is 
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or through the aid of a machine or device.”11 
Congress purposely drafted the language of the fixation requirement of 
Section 102(a) in a broad manner so as to encompass technologies that were 
not in existence at the time of the 1976 Act and to avoid largely unjustifiable 
distinctions between the form of fixation of a work, meaning the way in 
which the work was fixed.
12
 In the context of musical works, a composer 
could likely fulfill this by using sheet music, recording it, or storing it on a 
computer.
13
 Under Section 101 of the Copyright Act, a work is fixed “when 
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transitory 
duration.”14 Under Section 102 of the Copyright Act, “musical works” are 
clearly listed as one of the classes of creative works that are granted 
protection under copyright law.
15
  While an understanding of the elements of 
copyrightability in relation to musical works is critical to recognizing the 
 
8. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Copyright Act of 1976 §102. 
9. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01 [A], [B] 
(1990)). 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (empowering Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective . . . Discoveries.”) 
11. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(a). 
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 53 (1976) reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. 5666-67. Congress 
emphasized that the 1976 Act was not to differentiate between “the form, manner, or fixation” of the 
work. Congress also explained the importance of the fixation requirement as a line of demarcation 
between common law and statutory protection. “Unfixed” works, such as improvisational works or 
unrecorded choreographic works, performances, or broadcasts can receive common law or statutory 
protection under Section 301 of the Act, but may not receive Federal statutory protection under 
Section 102. 
13. Jon M. Garon, Copyright Basics for Musicians, GALLAGHER, CALLAHAN & GARTRELL, 
S.C. (March 2009), http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/music-copyright.html.  
14. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101. 
15. Id. § 102. 
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dissonance between modern classical music and the notion of “musical 
works” in copyright law, examining the history of copyright protections for 
musical works demonstrates that current protections for musical works under 
copyright law fail to harmonize with the innovative and avant-garde nature of 
modern classical music. 
B. History of Copyright Protections for Musical Works 
While musical works currently enjoy protection under the 1976 Act, the 
history leading up to this arguably insufficient protection reflects the tension 
between musical works and copyright law. This section will discuss a history 
of copyright protection for musical works, beginning with the birth of 
copyright law in the United States and through the latest variation of the 
Copyright Act. The history of copyright law in the United States shows that 
from the beginning, Congress did not take into account the changing 
landscape of music when drafting copyright laws and in fact, music has been 
treated almost as secondary class of works as opposed to other types of 
protected subject matter. As a result of this treatment, musical works are 
protected in a way that potentially stymies artistic creativity in musical 
composition. 
It was not until the Copyright Act of 1831,
16
 which expanded the 
Copyright Act of 1790 to include musical works, that U.S. copyright law 
recognized that musical works warranted protection. However, the scope of 
protection for musical works was limited because copyright protection 
extended only to the reproduction rights for printed music.
17
  Under the 
Copyright Act of 1909, the first major revision to the Copyright Act of 1790, 
Section 5(e) states that “musical compositions” are among the class of work 
that can be granted copyright registration.
18
 The 1909 Act expanded the world 
of exclusive rights for copyright holders of musical works to performance 
rights, arrangement rights, or setting the music or the melody to “any form of 
record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it 
may be read or reproduced.”19 Furthermore, the 1909 Act created the first 
compulsory mechanical license to allow people to create mechanical 
reproductions (phonographs) of musical works without the consent of the 
author of the work, provided that they adhered to the confines of the license.
20
 
 
16. Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). 
17. Id. 
18. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 § 5(e), repealed by Copyright 
Act of 1976, supra note 4. 
19. Id. § 1(e). 
20. Id. 
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While musical works have been contemplated as a protectable subject 
matter under copyright law, a troubling aspect of U.S. copyright law is that 
the term “musical works” has never been explicitly defined. In fact, in the 
House report detailing the debate surrounding the adoption of the 1976 Act, 
Congress merely glossed over the category of musical works, arguing that 
“musical works,” along with dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic 
works, have a fairly settled meaning and thus, do not require a more specific 
definition.
21
 In the House Report, the court justified not defining musical 
works because with the 1976 Act, the form of the work is not significant.
22
 
Even more problematic is in the same report, Congress reasoned that the four 
terms defined in Section 101 of the 1976 Act
23
 purportedly required 
definitions, “not only because the meaning of the term itself is unsettled but 
also because the distinction between ‘work’ and ‘material object’ requires 
clarification.”24 Furthermore, Congress expounded on the reasoning for 
defining “literary works,” stating that the term “does not connote any criterion 
of literary merit or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and 
similar factual, reference, or instructional works and compilations of data.”25 
It is unclear as to how a musical work has a fairly settled meaning while a 
literary work, one of the four terms defined in Section 101 of the 1976 Act, 
does not warrant such cavalier treatment. Contrary to Congress’ reasoning, a 
musical work does not automatically connote any artistic merit, because 
music is such an inherently subjective form of expression. A glimpse at the 
evolution of classical music, which I will discuss below, shows that the 
definition of a musical work is hardly “settled,” and that Congress was 
shortsighted in treating music in such a glib manner. Music is a 
quintessentially subjective form of artistic expression,
26
 one whose definition 
 
21. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 12 at 53. In this Report, Congress seemed to 
conclude that musical works, along with dramatic works and pantomimes and choreographic works 
commonplace enough in society that further definitions were unnecessary. However, Congress’s 
failure to define these categories of protectable subject matter has led to uncertainty as to whether 
more modern forms of art are copyrightable. A particular example of the consequences of failing to 
define certain types of protectable subject matter is the area of performance art. See David Bollier, 
Performance Art as Property, COMMONS MAG. (Nov. 11, 2005), http://onthecommons.org
/performance-art-property.  
22. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 12, at 53. 
23. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101. The four terms are literary works; pictorial, sculptural and 
graphic works (PSGs); motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and 
architectural works. 
24. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 12, at 54. 
25. Id. 
26. See Paul M. Grivinsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended 
Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 395 (1992); David May, Note, 
“So Long as Time Is Music”: When Musical Compositions are Substantially Similar, 60 S. CAL. L. 
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is far from “fairly settled,” as Congress believes, and deserves further scrutiny 
than the Congress’s cursory treatment. By not requiring a more specific 
definition of “musical work,” Congress opened up a Pandora’s Box of 
controversy as to what constitutes a musical work, as music styles have 
changed over time. 
Another potential consequence of Congress’s treatment of musical works 
in the Copyright is that in doing so, Congress has potentially limited artistic 
creativity by perpetuating what Professor Arewa calls a “visual-textual bias” 
against musical creativity, which prevents copyright law from fully protecting 
musical works and musical creativity.
27
  By visual-textual bias, Arewa posits 
that because the drafters of the Copyright Acts framed the protections for 
musical works under the influence of the notion of authorship in a literary 
sense, creativity in the music area tends to focus on written aspects of music, 
which in turn fails to include the full range of musical creativity.
28
 The visual-
textual bias prevalent in copyright reduces an inherently nonvisual art form 
(music) to its written representation.
29
 Arewa notes that this “reduction” is 
particularly problematic in determining copyrightability of musical works, 
because it “causes law to place music and interpretations of infringement in 
cases involving music into a category analogous to legal documents,”30 which 
almost applies a “four-corners” approach to musical compositions, not unlike 
contract law. By focusing on written and visual aspects of musical works, 
such an approach may hinder understanding of more modern approaches to 
musical composition that do not subscribe to traditional composition 
methods.
31
 
C. Current Methods of Interpretation of “Musical Works” and 
Copyrightability 
1. The Compendium’s definition of “music” is overly restrictive and 
contravenes with evolving notions of music. 
The issues facing copyright law and music are further complicated by an 
antiquated and overly simplistic definition of music used by the Copyright 
 
REV. 785, 806 (1987) (“[M]usical expression produces value by virtue of its relationship to 
nonmusical experience holds that the value musical expression produces, and the meaningful 
experience it imparts, is uniquely aesthetic.”). 
27. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright and Musical 
Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829, 1833 (2011). 
28. Id. 
29. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, A Musical Work is a Set of Instructions, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 
467, 483 (2014). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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Office. While it is settled the musical works are a class of copyrightable 
subject matter, where composers hit a “sour note” is in fulfilling the creativity 
element of a valid copyright. Because the 1976 Act fails to define a “musical 
work,” the Copyright Office relies on its internal manual, The Compendium 
III: Copyright Office Practices, to provide guidance on defining music.
32
 At 
the time I drafted this Comment, the third edition of the Compendium had not 
been promulgated. Because of this, my initial examination of the internal 
definition of “musical work” is based in the Compendium II: Copyright Office 
Practices. However, discussing both editions of The Compendium provides 
insight as to the developments that the Copyright Office has undertaken in 
determining copyrightability of musical works. 
Section 402 of the Compendium II defines music as a “succession of 
pitches or rhythms, or both, usually in some definite pattern.”33 While this 
definition seems fairly broad, the Compendium further defines music within 
the scope of three required elements: (1) melody, or a succession of single 
tones; (2) rhythm, or a grouping of pulses according to emphasis and length; 
and (3) harmony, or the combination of different pitches.
34
 The Compendium 
further narrows the definition of music by singling out the element of melody 
as the determinative factor of whether a work is copyrightable.
35
 Furthermore, 
the Compendium recognizes that “[s]tandard musical notation, using the five-
line four-space staff is the form most frequently employed to embody musical 
works,”36 but also states that a musical work can be sufficiently “fixed” for 
purposes of copyright if the work is embodied in the form of textual 
instructions for performance, if it is specific enough to be performed.
37
 
While the Copyright Office does not place a de minimis number of notes 
or measures that automatically qualify a musical work for copyright,
38
 it is 
clear from the text of the Compendium that the Office places a greater 
emphasis existing notes and traditional notions of music in order to determine 
copyright eligibility. The Copyright Office’s shortsighted emphasis on 
melody as the predominant element in determining whether a musical work 
 
32. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM III: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (3d ed. 
2014). 
33.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 402 (2d ed. 
1984). 
34.  Id. §§ 403-403.01. 
35.  Id. The Compendium further places an overemphasis on melody by stating that lack of 
sufficient melody may be grounds for withholding copyright protection, if other elements, such as the 
rhythm and harmony of the composition, supply all or substantially all of the copyrightable content 
of the work. 
36. Id. § 405.01(b). 
37. Id. 
38. Id.  §§ 403-403.01. 
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may receive copyright protection fails to take in to account changing 
aesthetics of music.
39
 Admittedly, attempting to distill the definition of a 
subjective art form, such as music, in to elements facilitates in providing an 
objective system for determining copyright eligibility. However, the problem 
with weighing certain so-called “elements,” such as melody, above other 
aspects of music is that it automatically places works that may not have an 
easily discernable melody, or may even have a complete lack of melody and 
rely on other musical techniques, on a lower scale than those that fit within 
more commonly accepted notions of music. Because of music’s inherently 
expressive qualities, it “may not be a relational system symbolic of elements 
in nonaesthetic experience, or primarily related to nonaesthetic value.”40  
Unlike other types of protectable subject matter, such as literary works, the 
inherently subjective qualities of music do not lend themselves to being 
pigeonholed in black letter “elements” that overly restrict the definition of 
music. Professor Arewa aptly sums up the dissonance between music and 
copyright law in the following: 
Music is inherently relational in its construction: the harmonic meaning of 
a particular note or series of notes depends on the context of those notes. In 
addition, music is typically related in some way to performance, which 
distinguishes it from other types of cultural production, such as literature. 
Music is often less representational than literature, which also strains the 
relationship between copyright and music. The restricted nature of 
the musical scale, limitations imposed by cultural and musical conventions, 
the centrality of performance in music, and the nonrepresentational and 
relational nature of music are all factors complicating the ease of translation 
of literary copyright to the musical context.
41
 
 
39. See Paul Théberge, Technology, Creative Practice and Copyright, in MUSIC AND 
COPYRIGHT 139, 140 (Simon Firth & Lee Marshall eds., 2d ed. 2004) (“The origins of music 
copyright law are rooted in a particular, restrictive notion of the musical work (defined as a 
combination of melody and harmony) and its fixation in a graphic form (the musical score).”). See 
also Jason Toynbee, Musicians, in MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT, id. at 125 (“Reducing music in copyright 
to basic elements, most importantly melody and . . . words, made this process even more 
straightforward.”). 
40. May, supra note 26, at 807; see also Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(The court analogized music with software programs and art projects, which are “not capable of 
ready classification into only five or six constituent elements; music is comprised of a large array of 
elements, some combination of which is protectable by copyright.”). 
41. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and 
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 556-7 (2006); see also V. KOFI AGAWU, PLAYING WITH 
SIGNS: A SEMIOTIC INTERPRETATION OF CLASSICAL MUSIC 15 (1991) (“Musicians are familiar with 
[the concept of music as a relational system rather than a substantive one] from the system of 
functional harmony, for example, by which a given note can take on different meanings depending 
on the key in which it occurs, and, within that key, the actual chord within which it functions.”). 
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On December 22, 2014, the Copyright Office promulgated the 
Compendium III: Copyright Office Practices, revising the definition of 
“musical works,” to be used by the Copyright Office.42 Notably, the new 
version of the Compendium eliminates the singling out of “melody” as the 
determinative factor to the copyrightability of a musical work.
43
 While this 
most recent version of the Compendium signifies a greater sensitivity on the 
part of the Copyright Office to unconventional composition practices and 
forms of musical creation and is an improvement on the previous two versions 
of the Compendium, this solution is unsatisfactory. By continuing to define 
“musical works” using black-letter elements, the new Compendium runs the 
risk of perpetuating the overly restrictive regime of copyrightability extended 
to musical works as well as an over-reliance on Western notions of musical 
composition.
44
 
A more problematic issue with the Copyright Office’s usage of the 
Compendium is that because the Compendium is an internal manual, it is not 
binding and, unlike regulations, does not have the force of law.
45
  Since it is 
an internal manual and is to be treated as guidance, the definitions in the 
Compendium should be considered more as guidelines than as a binding 
source. Furthermore, the fact that the Compendium has rarely been cited in 
any court documents is indicative of the notion that the Compendium should 
not be considered as heavily when determining the copyrightability of a 
musical work, because its relative lack of weight should not pose a bar to the 
granting of copyright protection.
46
 
2. Judicial Treatment of the Copyrightability of Music 
While there is precedent stating that rhythm and harmony may be 
copyrightable in certain circumstances,
47
 the Compendium’s definition of 
musical works fails to synchronize with this precedent by placing an over-
 
42. See COMPENDIUM III: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 32, § 802.1. 
43. Id. §802.3.   
44. See id. § 802.4(A) (In defining fixation for the purposes of musical works, the Copyright 
Office continues to show a preference for the traditional, five-line, four-space staff commonly used 
by Western composition methods). 
45. See Kugel v. United States, 947 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
46. See Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices, IP MALL, http://www.ipmall.info
/hosted_resources/copyrightcompendium.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (“A Westlaw search . . . 
shows citations by courts to the Compendium totaling less than fifty.”). This is in stark contrast to the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)’s Manual for Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) (also 
an internal manual), which has been cited almost five hundred times. 
47. See Levine v. McDonalds Corp., 735 F.Supp. 92, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rhythm and 
harmony can be copyrighted, even if the melody is monotonous repetition of one tone); Tempo 
Music v. Famous Music, 838 F.Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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emphasis on the element of melody. In Levine v. McDonalds Corp., the court 
discussed the copyrightability of musical works and concluded that the use of 
a minimal number of notes in a work containing substantial other musical 
elements does not prevent a work from being copyrightable.
48
 In a subsequent 
case, the court in Tempo Music v. Famous Music held that a per se standard 
banning harmonies entirely from copyright protection would “be too broad 
and would perhaps deprive appropriate protection to composition which 
contains sufficient originality and creativity to warrant such protection.”49 
However, most courts still resort to concluding that music consists of rhythm, 
harmony, melody, and in some works, words.
50
 Furthermore, most courts are 
still conservative in evaluating the elements of music separately,
51
 rarely 
finding protectable expression in harmony, and continuing to place an over-
emphasis on melody. While progress has been made in a judicial broadening 
of originality in music,
52
 courts are still mired in the traditional notions of 
music expressed in melody, rhythm, and harmony, “notwithstanding 
fundamental paradigm shifts over the last 100 years that have altered how 
music is composed and enjoyed.”53 
The Compendium’s treatment of musical works coupled with existing case 
 
48.  Levine, 735 F.Supp. at 99. 
49. Tempo Music, 838 F.Supp. at 169; see Valeria M. Castanaro, “It’s the Same Old Song”: 
The Failure of the Originality Requirement in Musical Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1271, 1281 (2008) (noting that “[t]his notion of originality fails to account for the 
multitude of components that make up a musical work.”). 
50. See Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 
591, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1740, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1178 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion amended and 
superseded on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 388 F.3d 
1189, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A musical composition consists of rhythm, harmony and 
melody, and it is from these elements that originality is to be determined”); N. Music Corp. v. King 
Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. 
Supp. 904, 913 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (“musical creation” consists of ”the grouping of notes, similarity of 
bars, harmony or melody”). 
51. See MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 7.12 (2014). 
52. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004) (the Ninth Circuit observed that music 
composed of other elements, such as pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, and chord rhythms in addition 
to the traditional three elements of melody, rhythm, and harmony); see also Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 
503 (6th Cir. 1999) (the lower court considered idea, phraseology, lyrics, chord progressions, and 
other musical elements in determining whether a musical work was copyrightable); Erickson v. 
Blake, 839 F. Supp.2d 1132, 1138-9 (D. Or. 2012) (stating that relevant elements that may be 
examined in determining copyrightability of a musical work may include melody, harmony, rhythm, 
pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, chord progressions, “hooks,” instrumental figures, and overall song 
structure.); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F. 2d 718 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
the copyrightability of the musical composition in question was not a four-note sequence, but the 
fitting together of the sequence with other melodious phrases in a unique composition). 
53. Alan Korn, Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring Substantiality of 
Contemporary Musical Expression, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 489, 491 (2007). 
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law reinforces the notion that copyright law in relation to musical works still 
retains its bias towards traditional notions of classical music by emphasizing 
an element-by-element analysis of copyrightability as well as a visual-textual 
bias by favoring standard musical notation over more nonconventional, but 
arguably still tangible, mediums of expression. The lack of consensus in past 
precedent further supports the notion that courts also subscribe to a Western-
biased notion of musical composition and creativity. 
D. The Evolution of Classical Music in the Post-20th Century Era 
The evolution of classical music in the post-20
th
 century era, particularly 
with the rise of experimental music and other techniques that reject 
commonly-accepted aspects of music, contravenes with the definition of a 
“musical work” in the Compendium and has led to a class of musical works 
that may be denied copyright protection because they do not strictly fall 
within the definition used by the Copyright Office. This section will discuss 
the evolution of classical music into the post-20
th
 Century era and the issues 
that modern classical music poses in respect to copyright law. 
Before the 20
th
 Century era of classical music, composers, starting from 
the Classical era of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Joseph Haydn, 
demonstrated adherence to a structural format to their works that provided 
clarity to the listener.
54
 As the Classical era reached its heyday, early 
Romantic era composers, such as Hector Berlioz, Frederic Chopin, Felix 
Mendelssohn, Robert Schumann, Franz Liszt, and Giuseppe Verdi, began to 
explore a balancing of expressive qualities of music with the more structural 
qualities of music, using various techniques.
55
 However, with the turn of the 
20
th
 Century, composers began to move in different directions. Notably, a 
hallmark of early 20
th
 Century music was the beginning of breaking with 
traditional notions of tonality that defined previous eras of classical music.
56
  
This departure from traditional notions of tonality and harmony shocked 
many for its stark contrast to the celebration of harmony that defined the 
Romantic era.
57
 Arnold Schoenberg was particularly known for developing a 
dodecaphony, or the twelve-tone system, that systematically used all twelve 
 
54. History of Classical Music, NAXOS MUSIC LIBRARY, http://www.naxos.com/education
/brief_history.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). Classical era composers strove to move away from the 
highly ornamental style of the Baroque era classical music of Bach and Vivaldi. 
55. Id.  
56. See Notes and Noise: Reassessing the Sound that was 20
th
-Century Classical Music, THE 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.economist.com/node/21569370/print.  
57. See id. (“Experimenting with atonality, microtonality, electronic distortion of sound and 
the role of chance: the developments favoured by the more innovative 20th-century composers do not 
make for easy listening.”). 
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notes of the chromatic scale, compared with the traditional seven-tone system 
used by most classical composers.
58
 Soon after, many composers shifted 
further away from the use of traditional Western notions of music, those upon 
which copyright law is based, and began experimenting with less commonly 
accepted musical techniques. Most notably, Igor Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring 
both shocked and transformed the way that subsequent composers perceived 
rhythm by frequent meter changes and unexpected accents.
59
 
From the 1940s to the end of the 20
th
 century, composers further pushed 
the boundaries by experimenting with the lack of melody, or silence, in music. 
Karlheinz Stockhausen endeavored into the world of electronic music and 
pioneered two types of musical composition: aleatory in serial composition, 
otherwise known as controlled chance, which allows the musician to choose 
short phrases from a set list and play them in an arbitrary number of times; 
and spatialization, which exploits the listener’s ability to locate sound.60 
Composers also experimented with using different method to produce sounds, 
such as using electronic music and using instruments in nontraditional matters 
to emit sounds. With the turn of the 21
st
 century, composers seem poised to 
continue this trend of pushing the boundaries of acceptable music and to 
further depart from the traditional elements of music used in copyright law.
61
 
Composers such as John Zorn, Julian Andersen, and Tansy Davies have fused 
classical music with other musical genres and practices in their works to 
create new sounds.
62
 Indeed, it seems that in the 21
st
 century, composers are 
poised to blur the lines of music even further by leaving even more of the 
 
58. See Robert Sherrane, Arnold Schoenberg & the Second Viennese School, MUSIC HISTORY 
102, http://www.ipl.org/div/mushist/twen/schoenberg.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“This method 
involves the composer choosing a row consisting of all twelve notes, and then building the piece by 
using the row, or sections of it, either melodically or harmonically, forward, backward, inverted, or 
in retrograde inversion.”). 
59. Tom Vitale, Then the Curtain Opened: The Bracing Impact of Stravinsky’s ‘Rite,’ NPR 
(May 25, 2013 5:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/deceptivecadence/2013/05/25/186497792/then-
the-curtain-opened-the-bracing-impact-of-stravinskys-rite. (“It seems as though at first he’s going to 
have this regular pulse. But then these accents start landing in unexpected places, and you can’t quite 
get the pattern of it.”). 
60. ROBIN MACONIE, OTHER PLANETS: THE MUSIC OF KARLHEINZ STOCKHAUSEN 296 
(2006). 
61. See Nick Shave, The Shape of Sounds to Come, BBC MUSIC MAG., 26-32 (October 2009). 
The author interviewed ten composers to discuss trends in western classical music. The composers 
came to the conclusion that music is too diverse to categorize or limit. 
62. See Tom Service, Shuffle and Cut, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 6, 2003), http://www.
theguardian.com/music/2003/mar/07/classicalmusicandopera.artsfeatures; Julian Andersen, FABER 
MUSIC, http://www.fabermusic.com/Composers-Details.aspx?composerid=13 (last visited Jan. 12, 
2014); Tom Service, She’s Got the Funk, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2001), 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2001/jun/18/artsfeatures. 
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traditional rules of music behind.
63
 
A particular growing trend in 21
st
 century classical music is polystylism, 
which combines elements of different music genres and compositional 
techniques in one unified work.
64
 A particular issue that may arise with 
polystylism is that composers may take aspects of different musical genres, 
such as a melody from a rock and roll song that may not yet be in the public 
domain, and incorporate it in to an original polystylist work. Because the 
composer would be using a melody from a work that is not yet in the public 
domain, the work would not be registerable, even if it fulfills the other 
elements of a musical work. While the composer could potentially be able to 
copyright the work as a derivative work under Section 103 of the 1976 Act,
65
 
provided that the composer received permission to use a portion of the 
preexisting work, receiving such permission could prove to be an arduous 
process, particularly with an original author who is reluctant to license his or 
her work. This could potentially lead to a dwindling number of composers 
who use polystylism to incorporate preexisting melodies into new works. 
Furthermore, 21
st
-century composers have begun to further experiment 
with serialism, which is a compositional technique that involves creating 
music according to a series of values other than melody or harmony.
66
 
Serialism could potentially run afoul of the Copyright Office’s registration 
practices, because if a composer uses a series of values (tones on the scale) as 
the “melody” of the work, the office may consider the work to fail the idea-
expression dichotomy central to copyright law, as the office could equate the 
series of values with facts, which would not be copyrightable under Section 
102(b) of the Copyright Act.
67
 
Another potential area of contemporary classical music that could 
 
63. See Welcome to the 21
st
 Century, Classical Music?, J CONCERT ARTISTS (May 11, 2013), 
http://jconcertartists.com/welcome-to-the-21st-century-classical-music/ (Discussing the current 
trends in 21
st
 century classical music and concludes that because so many traditions and rules of 
classical music were done away with in the 20
th
 century, it is hard to tell where classical music is 
headed next, but that composers seem to be in a “musical free for all, where there are no rules, and 
there can be very little judgment about what is good and what isn’t.”). 
64. Id. 
65. Copyright Act of 1976 § 103. Under this section, the copyright in the derivative work 
would extend only to the original material contributed by the author, and would not extend to the 
preexisting melody used in the work. Furthermore, the derivative work copyright would not extend to 
any part of the work where the second author used preexisting copyrighted material. 
66. See Anne Midgette, Contemporary Classical: A Primer, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 
19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/contemporary-classical-a-primer/2011
/07/13/gIQAqhDDQJ_story.html. Serialist composers commonly use the twelve-tone scale 
promulgated by Schoenberg and create musical phrases by combining all twelve notes of the 
chromatic scale in a fixed order, and then use the phrase as a basis for the work. 
67. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(b). 
YU FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2015  11:12 AM 
286 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.  L. REV. [Vol. 19:2 
 
contravene with the Copyright Office’s definition of music would be the 
increasing trend of aleatoric music, where the composer leaves some aspects 
of the work up to chance, or a primary element of the composer’s work is left 
to chance or the determination of the performers. The issue with this type of 
music and the copyright office’s definition of a musical work is that because 
some of the work is left to chance, the work may not be properly “fixed” in a 
tangible meaning of expression if it is not recorded or left in sheet music. 
Because an inherent quality of aleatoric music is that no two performances are 
the same, similar to improvisational jazz music, a piece that is aleatoric in 
nature and that uses the technique of silence could be denied copyright 
registration for not fitting within the definition of musical works used by the 
Copyright Office. Aleatoric music, along with the emergence of more modern 
musical techniques, such as improvisation, emphasizes the clumsy fit of 
copyright for musical techniques in the modern era.
68
 
1. Comparing Modern Classical Music with Traditional Classical Music 
The disconnect between modern classical music and copyright law is 
highlighted by comparing a traditional classical piece with a modern classical 
piece. A recent example of modern classical music is particularly 
demonstrative of this difference is the music of Terje Isungset.
69
 Isungset is 
known for creating “ice music,” meaning music made on instruments 
primarily constructed out of ice. Because of the constantly changing nature of 
the medium on which the music is performed,
70
 the music, however 
aesthetically pleasing it may be, could fail the elements test for 
copyrightability that is used by the Copyright Office because it may not have 
a discernable melody. Furthermore, because of the inability for the piece to be 
replicated, due to the fact that ice never melts at the same frequency and 
because Isungset’s music requires an element of improvisation,71 its copyright 
protections as a musical work would only extend to the material submitted to 
the Copyright Office.
72
 Even if Isungset “fixed” his work by recording it, the 
 
68. See Arewa, supra note 27, at 1843. 
69. See Norwegian Festival Shows Off the Musicality of Ice, NPR (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/21/264399959/ice-musical-festival. 
70. Id. (Noting “[y]ou cannot go on stage and expect a certain sound. You have to play with 
the sound that instrument actually can make. And then try to create good music out of this.”). 
71. See Turning a Glacier Into a Tuba: Ice Music from Norway, NPR (Feb. 24, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/02/24/172818754/turning-a-glacier-into-a-tuba-ice-music-from-norway  
(“Quite often, I don’t actually know how my instrument will sound. So I just have to listen to the 
sound that is being created and try to create music out of this sound . . . .”). 
72. See COMPENDIUM III: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 32, §802.4 
(“Improvised works are not registrable unless they are fixed in a tangible form, such as in a 
transcribed copy, a phonorecord, or an audiovisual recording. A registration for an improvised 
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fact that the piece would never be able to be repeated again, due to the fact 
that the frequency at which the ice melts would be nearly impossible to 
replicate, would mean that Isungset would only receive protection for the 
sound recording of the work that he submitted, rather than the composition 
itself because it would not be able to be replicated. 
In contrast to Isungset’s work, Ludwig von Beethoven’s Symphony No. 
9,
73
 arguably one of the most influential pieces of classical music ever 
composed,
74
 utilizes quintessential musical techniques that are commonly 
accepted under copyright law. In Symphony No. 9, Beethoven seemed to 
capture the creation of the world, spiritual enlightenment, and the joy of 
humankind all in one piece.
75
 Unlike Isungset’s ice music, Beethoven’s work, 
though far more expressive than many of his fellow composers, has a 
discernable melody that is “fixed” by notation onto a traditional five-line four-
space music staff. Furthermore, although both Isungset and Beethoven’s 
pieces are played on musical instruments, Beethoven’s work involves no 
improvisation and can be easily replicated by orchestras around the world. 
Beethoven’s work would easily withstand the Compendium’s definition of 
music, because it satisfies the three-element definition of music (melody, 
rhythm, and harmony) and is fixated in a commonly accepted form.. Unlike 
Beethoven, Isungset’s ice music, because it relies heavily on improvisation 
and the nature of the instrument at the moment, may not as easily withstand 
scrutiny. However, an artist like Isungset, whose creations may not fall within 
the strict bounds of commonly accepted notions of musical works but clearly 
show creativity and artistic merit, should not be precluded from gaining 
protection for his creative expression. 
E. Solution 
It seems clear from the trajectory of classical music that the definition of 
“musical work” used in the Compendium is antiquated and remains in the era 
of music where artists conformed to traditional ideas of music. I would 
suggest weighing the elements of music equally, thereby removing the 
emphasis on melody from the definition, in order to encompass a broader 
class of musical works that would not have otherwise received registration. 
Furthermore, because of the inherently aesthetic and subjective quality of 
 
musical work will extend only to the material that has been submitted to the Office.”). 
73. Tom Service, Symphony Guide: Beethoven’s Ninth (‘Choral’), THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 9, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/music/tomserviceblog/2014/sep/09/symphony-guide-beethoven-
ninth-choral-tom-service.  
74. Christopher H. Gibbs, Notes on Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, NPR (Jun. 13, 2006), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5487727. 
75. Id. 
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music, as discussed above, I would propose using the definition of musical 
works in the Compendium as a guideline, rather than as a strict definition, in 
order to protect future generations of classical music composers who will 
continue to push the boundaries and the average listener’s perception of 
music. By reforming the definition of musical works utilized by the Copyright 
Office, courts will be more receptive to broadening their understanding of 
originality in music. As a result, composers that may not have been able to 
receive copyright protection for their compositions due to failing to meet the 
more narrow requirement for originality in music will be able to receive 
protection for their works under a broader definition of originality in the 
scope of musical works. 
CONCLUSION 
Classical music has evolved and grown from the highly formalized 
Baroque era to the arguable lack of form that defines the 20
th
 century era. 
What paths contemporary music will take remain to be seen, but it is clear that 
the current definition used to determine copyright eligibility for musical 
works is antiquated and “fails to account for unique methods of musical 
expression that exist beyond those narrowly drawn boundaries.”76 By 
broadening the definition of “musical work” used in the Compendium and de-
emphasizing melody’s importance over the other two elements of music, 
composers can rest easy, knowing that they can create new and original 
compositions that will receive the protection they deserve. 
JAMIE M. YU* 
 
 
76. Korn, supra note 53, at 490. 
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